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Abstract
Background: Euthanasia can be thought of as being either active or passive; but the precise definition of “passive
euthanasia” is not always clear. Though all passive euthanasia involves the withholding of life-sustaining treatment, there
would appear to be some disagreement about whether all such withholding should be seen as passive euthanasia.
Main text: At the core of the disagreement is the question of the importance of an intention to bring about death: must
one intend to bring about the death of the patient in order for withholding treatment to count as passive euthanasia, as
some sources would indicate, or does withholding in which death is merely foreseen belong to that category? We may
expect that this unclarity would be important in medical practice, in law, and in policy. The idea that withholding life-
sustaining treatment is passive euthanasia is traced to James Rachels’s arguments, which lend themselves to the claim
that passive euthanasia does not require intention to end life. Yet the argument here is that Rachels’s arguments are
flawed, and we have good reasons to think that intention is important in understanding the moral nature of actions.
As such, we should reject any understanding of passive euthanasia that does not pay attention to intent.
Short conclusion: James Rachels’s work on active and passive euthanasia has been immensely influential; but this is
an influence that we ought to resist.
Keywords: Euthanasia, Passive euthanasia, James Rachels, Intent, Withholding treatment, End-of-life care
Background
Euthanasia is a controversial and emotive topic, but nor-
mative debate about it resembles trench warfare. People
who are in favour of liberal laws tend to stay in favour of
liberal laws, but rarely persuade those who aren’t to
change their minds; and the same applies, mutatis mu-
tandis, in respect of people who are in favour of tight re-
striction or criminalisation. There is little argumentative
innovation; what work there is tends to be – as Søren
Holm has indicated – a matter of fortifying established
positions [1]. It is rather as if the soldiers in opposing
trenches, accepting that there is no territorial break-
through to be made, have resigned themselves to half-
heartedly throwing gravel at each other in the hope that
they might dent their way to victory. In this context, an-
other paper on euthanasia may be seen as attritional at
best. It is not hard to see why.
The intention of this essay is not to make any normative
claim about assisted dying. Rather, it is built around the
idea that a significant shift in the debate is likely to require
conceptual clarity, and that a fruitful shift certainly will;
and that there is significant unclarity surrounding a num-
ber of aspects of euthanasia that impedes any such shift.
I shall focus in particular on an unclarity in the term
“passive euthanasia”. The first part of my argument is
that there are at least two very different understandings
of the term in use. This means that participants in de-
bates are often talking past each other. This is bad
enough; but the second part of the argument contends
that one of the candidate definitions of “passive euthan-
asia” is deeply misleading. This generates (and prevents
the simple solution, or dissolution, of) significant prob-
lems for patients and medical staff who have to make
decisions in practice, and for the lawyers who may have
to give an opinion on those decisions. The argument
echoes many of the arguments mounted by Garrard and
Wilkinson in 2005 [2], in which they take aim at James
© The Author(s). 2020 Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License,
which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give
appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if
changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons
licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons
licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain
permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver (http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the
data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated in a credit line to the data.
Correspondence: iain.brassington@manchester.ac.uk
CSEP/ Law, University of Manchester, Oxford Road, Manchester M13 9PL, UK
Brassington BMC Medical Ethics           (2020) 21:41 
https://doi.org/10.1186/s12910-020-00481-7
Rachels’s highly influential claims from 1975 [3] about
active and passive euthanasia.1 This is more than pleon-
asm, because – as we shall see – though the position ar-
ticulated by Rachels is flawed, the influence of his paper




I shall take as my point of departure Heather Draper’s
definition of euthanasia, which is something of a touch-
stone. For her, death by euthanasia
must be defined as death that results from the
intention of one person to kill another person, using
the most gentle and easy means possible, that is
solely motivated by the best interests of the person
who dies [5].2
It is reasonable to infer from this that any instance in
which means other than the gentlest and easiest possible
are selected to bring about death is not an instance of eu-
thanasia proper. This is because if death by euthanasia is
motivated by the best interests of the person who dies –
which may be taken to be a necessary though not suffi-
cient part of euthanasia’s definition – it would always be
in their better interests for the gentler available option to
be used, the best being by definition that than which there
is no better. Therefore, intentional killing that does not
use the gentlest and easiest possible means cannot be eu-
thanasia. At best, it is botched euthanasia; but it may not
even be that, since we would presumably want to distin-
guish between instances in which the gentlest means are
not selected, and those in which they are but in which
their administration (for some reason) goes wrong.
Draper does not stipulate that death should be re-
quested; this means that, under her definition, non-
voluntary euthanasia is possible. On the other hand, it
seems reasonable to assume that a positive desire to re-
main alive is trumps when making judgements about
best interests, and that the phrase “involuntary euthan-
asia” is consequently an oxymoron. Neither does Draper
make any stipulation about the identity of the person
who does the killing, or about the relationship between
the killer and the killed. This seems correct. Who the
agents are might make a difference to the permissibility
of a given instance of euthanasia – that is a possibility
that merits investigation, but in another paper – and it
might be the sort of thing lawmakers ought to consider;
but it is not central to whether a putative mercy-killing
is euthanasia by definition.
I am now in a position to offer this as a simplified def-
inition of euthanasia:
Definition 1 Euthanasia is the intentional ending of one
person’s life by another, motivated solely by the best
interest of the person who dies.
Note the distinction between intent and motivation.
Motivation refers to a general desire to secure the best
interests of the patient, intent to the particular actions
performed in the service of that motivation. This will
prove important later.
A potential difficulty concerning motivation and intent
is that either may be unclear or impure. Agents can, and
frequently do, have mixed motivations for this or that
action; further, agents may be psychologically opaque
even to themselves, and unable as a result to say pre-
cisely why they did something.3 It follows from this that
it may be difficult truly to assess motive and intent, and
correspondingly difficult to say with certainty whether a
given instance of ending a person’s life is, in the real
world, truly an instance of euthanasia. That said, the fact
that there may be obscurity on this matter does not
mean that there always will be. Sometimes, and possibly
often, assessments of motive and intent will be straight-
forward; and for the sake of the conceptual clarification
that is the concern of this essay, possible psychological
opacity matters little. We will only stand a chance of
assessing whether an action fits the definition of euthan-
asia if we can get that definition straight in the first
place; and getting a definition straight does not depend
on how likely it is that any putative instance of euthan-
asia really is properly so called. In what follows, we can
assume that the motives and intents attributed to actors
are nothing more or less than they appear to be.
We may append to Definition 1 a distinction between
active and passive euthanasia. The former would de-
scribe an instance in which Alice brings about Bob’s
death, intentionally and motivated solely by Bob’s best
interest, by performing some procedure on Bob.4 The
latter would describe an instance in which Alice brings
about Bob’s death, intentionally and motivated solely by
Bob’s best interest, by withholding something necessary
for his life to continue. A deliberate overdose of barbitu-
rates might count as active euthanasia; removing a
1As well as calling his 1975 NEJM paper “Active and Passive
Euthanasia”, Rachels would appear to have used this same title for a
chapter in his The End of Life [4]. Happily, and with only one
exception, everything by Rachels to which I refer in this essay is – at
least currently – available for free from www.jamesrachels.org.
2p. 176
3I am grateful to Simona Giordano for bringing this point to my
attention.
4The editors have asked me to make clear that Alice and Bob, and all
the other characters in the thought-experiments in this essay, are fic-
tional. An exception to that rule applies when I choose to place myself
as a character in a thought-experiment: I believe that I am real. I trust
that the context will make all clear.
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ventilator, or deciding never to ventilate to begin with,
might count as passive euthanasia. (For the sake of flu-
ency, “withholding” is used throughout this essay to
cover both situations in which a treatment regime is not
begun, and situations in which a treatment regime once
begun is removed: withdrawal should be thought of as
withholding treatment from this time forward.) Thus
two more definitions can be offered, each of which is
narrower than Definition 1:
Definition 2: Active euthanasia is the intentional ending
of one person’s life by another, motivated solely by the best
interest of the person who dies, through the deliberate ad-
ministration of a life-ending substance or procedure.
Definition 3: Passive euthanasia is the intentional ending
of one person’s life by another, motivated solely by the best
interest of the person who dies, through the deliberate with-
holding of a life-preserving substance or procedure.
In essence, the difference between active and passive
euthanasia on this account is the difference between
adding something that otherwise wouldn’t be there, and
removing something that otherwise could be.
However, Definition 3 is not reflected in a great deal of
the medical, medical ethical, and medicolegal literature. A
few examples might be offered, in chronological order.
Moreland wrote in a 1988 paper that “[p]assive euthanasia
occurs when a patient is allowed to die by withholding or
withdrawing life-sustaining treatment” (emphasis mine) [6].
Similarly, when writing about voluntary active euthanasia in
1992, Dan Brock took pains to distinguish his topic from
“withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment,
which some commentators characterize as ‘passive euthan-
asia’” [7].5 A letter to the BMJ from 2007 insists that passive
euthanasia “whereby medical treatment is stopped and na-
ture is allowed to take its course” is available and sometimes
endorsed by the courts in the UK [8]. For Lo Ping-cheung,
‘Active euthanasia’ refers to terminating life via ac-
tion, i.e., causing death by commission [ … ]. ‘Pas-
sive euthanasia’ refers to terminating life via
inaction, i.e., causing death by omission [9].
On an archived web-page, undated but copyrighted to
2014, the BBC states that
[p]assive euthanasia occurs when the patient dies
because the medical professionals either don't do
something necessary to keep the patient alive, or
when they stop doing something that is keeping the
patient alive [10].
Alanazi and Alanzi have written that “[a]n example of pas-
sive euthanasia is simply letting a patient die without pro-
viding necessary treatment to save or prolong that patient’s
life” (emphasis mine) [11]. In a 2016 paper, Varelius refers
to “withholding and withdrawing life-supporting treatment
from non-competent physically ill or injured patients” as a
kind of passive euthanasia [12]. Potter treats “passive eu-
thanasia” as referring straightforwardly to the withdrawal of
treatment at the end of life [13]; Nair-Collins asserts that
“passive euthanasia means to allow death to occur [and] is
more commonly simply termed withholding or withdraw-
ing life-sustaining treatment” [14].
Doubtless one could produce more examples with a lit-
tle searching. Though there is a few cosmetic differences
between the understandings listed in the last paragraph,
those understandings are fundamentally alike in allowing
for the idea that passive euthanasia is simply the withhold-
ing or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment; the require-
ment that death be intended is absent. As such, the
definition upon which they build is something like this:
Definition 3* Passive euthanasia is the ending of one per-
son’s life by another, motivated solely by the best interest of
the person who dies, through the deliberate withholding of a
life-preserving substance or life-preserving procedure.
Under Definition 3, though all instances of passive eu-
thanasia are instances of withholding treatment, and
though withholding treatment may count as passive eu-
thanasia, not all instances of withholding will – only
those in which treatment is withheld with the intention
of ending life.6 Under Definition 3*, no appeal is made
to any such intention: all instances of passive euthanasia
are instances of withholding treatment, and, provided
the motivation is the best interests of the one who dies,
all instances of withholding treatment are instances of
passive euthanasia. Alice need not intend Bob’s death.
One possible implication of Definition 3* is that acced-
ing to a refusal of treatment, or to an advance directive
refusing treatment, could count as a form of passive eu-
thanasia. Though such accession would not necessarily
satisfy the medical best interests of the patient, we ought
to keep in mind that medical best interests do not ex-
haust best interests sensu lato, which would include a
patient’s desires. Being motivated to withdraw treatment
because it has been competently refused may therefore
plausibly count as being motivated by the best interest
of the person who dies. As such, quite a lot of fairly rou-
tine treatment decisions may turn out to be forms of
5We cannot infer that Brock aligns himself with those who
characterise withholding or withdrawal as passive euthanasia; he is
simply pointing out that such people exist.
6This is clear in Draper’s definition: “Withholding of therapy is not
always passive euthanasia” [5].
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passive euthanasia if we accept Definition 3* that would not
count as passive euthanasia according to Definition 3.7
(Draper and Slowther appear to endorse Definition 3*
when they say that
([a] ctive euthanasia is said to have occurred when
the person intending the death took some positive
action to ensure this outcome – such as
administering a lethal dose of medication.
(Passive euthanasia occurs when an action that
could have prevented death is not taken (e.g. antibiotics
are not given) or an intervention that is keeping death
at bay is withdrawn (e.g. artificial ventilation) [15].
(However, since intention is mentioned on the previous
page as part of the broader definition of euthanasia, it is not
unreasonable to take it as implicit in the definition of passive
euthanasia, which brings it back into line with Definition 3.)
Definitions 3 and 3* cannot both be correct – an
intention to end life either is or isn’t part of the definition
of passive euthanasia – and if nothing else, intellectual
tidiness requires that we work out which (if either) is.
However, there is more riding on this than tidiness. An in-
stance of withholding treatment may or may not count as
passive euthanasia depending on whether one cleaves to
Definition 3 or Definition 3*; and in jurisdictions in which
passive euthanasia is illegal, that will mean that determin-
ing the legality of withholding will depend on the defin-
ition chosen: if all withholding is passive euthanasia and
all euthanasia is illegal, then all withholding will be illegal
too. Ensuring that the term “passive euthanasia” is cor-
rectly understood will therefore clearly be a matter of
great importance to the patients, medical staff, and law-
yers involved in such decisions. Indeed, determining
whether passive euthanasia is legal at all may depend on
the definition that one chooses. In this light, and though
any more thoroughgoing analysis belongs elsewhere, one
might note that when Markandey Katju, the judge who
delivered the opinion in the Indian case of Shanbaug
[16],8 determined that passive euthanasia is legal in India,
he did so on an understanding of the term that appeared
to bounce between Definition 3 and Definition 3*, but
which relied more heavily on the latter. Withholding treat-
ment was deemed lawful, and was understood as passive
euthanasia; and this led to the determination that passive
euthanasia was lawful. But if law is built on terms that are
not clearly defined or consistently used, that would seem
to store up problems for the future. And, of course, fur-
ther problems are stored up if any chosen definition is un-
convincing in its own right. Clarity is important.
Withholding and withdrawal of treatment understood as
euthanasia
Can this confusion be untangled? The most straightforward
way would be to show that one of the candidate definitions
of passive euthanasia as mistaken; and the position put and
defended throughout the rest of this essay is that it is Defin-
ition 3* that we should abandon. It follows from this that
any ethical or legal opinion that builds on it should be seen
as shaky at best. To help make the case, it is worth taking a
quick look at the genealogy of Definition 3*.
When Alanazi and Alanzi [11] call withholding treat-
ment passive euthanasia, they cite Malm’s paper on killing
and letting die [18], and appeal to arguments made by
James Rachels. Malm, in turn, also cites Rachels. Google
Scholar says that Rachels’s 1975 paper on active and pas-
sive euthanasia has been cited over a thousand times to
date; and via innumerable lectures to innumerable stu-
dents, its influence will have gone further than might be
suggested by the number of published citations. It is in
this paper that, without actually defining active and pas-
sive euthanasia, Rachels puts forward the claim that
[t]he distinction between active and passive euthanasia
is thought to be crucial for medical ethics. The idea is
that it is permissible, at least in some cases, to withhold
treatment and allow a patient to die, but it is never
permissible to take direct action to kill a patient [3].
Now, none of the definitions of euthanasia offered above
makes any claim about permissibility – and normative
claims do not have an obvious place in attempts to de-
fine any term. However, from the structure of the pas-
sage from which this quotation is taken, it is fairly clear
that Rachels wants us to link killing (of which people
tend to disapprove) with active euthanasia, and letting
die (in respect of which people tend to be more flexible
in their attitudes) with passive. It is not unreasonable to
see in this the genome of Definition 3*. And a couple of
pages later, he asks and answers a rhetorical question:
Why do so many people think there is an important
moral difference between active and passive euthan-
asia? One reason is that they believe the more
7I am grateful to Margot Brazier and to Dieter Birnbacher for pressing
me for clarification on this point. By instinct, I would want to resist
the idea that it would be euthanasia to withdraw treatment at the
patient’s request; but that is not sufficient to show that Definition 3* is
mistaken. That said, as we shall see, I think that Definition 3* is
mistaken.
8In brief, this case considered the legality of withdrawing treatment
from a woman who had been in a prolonged vegetative state, and who
was expected never to recover. That euthanasia was mentioned at all
in the ratio is indicative of certain presumptions about the relationship
between (passive) euthanasia and withdrawal of treatment. See my
“How Not to Talk About Passive Euthanasia”, currently in press with
the Indian Journal of Medical Ethics, for a fuller analysis of the case
[17].
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general proposition that killing someone is morally
worse than letting someone die [3].
For sure, it might be that Rachels is simply indicating that
“many people” draw a close link between passive euthan-
asia and letting die; we do not have to think that he en-
dorses it based on this quotation. In itself, this does not
tell us much about the nature of that link. Indeed, an asso-
ciation between passive euthanasia and letting die, on the
grounds that the former is a form of the latter, is perfectly
within the scope of Definition 3, and so those who think
that Definition 3 is correct and 3* incorrect should have
no difficulty here. (The difference between Definition 3
and Definition 3* on this front is that adherents to the
former will want to deny that the truth of the claim that
anyone who commits passive euthanasia is letting the pa-
tient die implies the truth of the claim that anyone who
lets a patient die is committing passive euthanasia.) On
this reading, all Rachels is saying is that if and when letting
die is permissible, then so is killing, and that this means
that if passive euthanasia is permissible, then so is active.
However, the tone of the passage allows for the infer-
ence that there is more than an association between the
two – that there is something more like identity. It is per-
haps notable that, while the bulk of his essay concerns the
difference between killing and letting die, its title is simply
“Active and Passive Euthanasia”. Rachels has drawn the
dots and given us a pen with which to join them. More ex-
plicitly, in The End of Life, he writes that
[b]y ‘active euthanasia’ we mean taking some
positive action designed to kill the patient; for
example, giving a lethal injection of potassium
chloride. ‘Passive euthanasia’, on the other hand,
means simply refraining from doing anything to
keep the patient alive [4].
The emphasis in this quotation is mine. Rachels links ac-
tive euthanasia with a particular design that he does not
link to passive. In his account of passive euthanasia, two
things are absent: treatment, and a requirement that the
end of life be intended.
A parenthetical point worth making here is that Rachels
looks for support for his claim about what many people
think about active and passive euthanasia to a statement
from the American Medical Association. Thus, he says,
[t]his doctrine [of the moral difference between
active and passive euthanasia] seems to be accepted by
most doctors, and in 1973 it was endorsed in the first
policy statement ever issued by the American Medical
Association. That statement said, in its entirety:
The intentional termination of the life of one human
being by another – mercy killing – is contrary to that
for which the medical profession stands and is contrary
to the policy of the American Medical Association.
The cessation of the employment of extraordinary
means to prolong the life of the body when there is ir-
refutable evidence that biological death is imminent is
the decision of the patient and/or his immediate family.
The advice and judgment of the physician should be
freely available to the patient and/or his immediate
family.
In subsequent statements the AMA refined its policy,
but the central idea [… ] has remained [3].
Note, though, that this statement is only in accordance with
a claim about the difference between active and passive eu-
thanasia, and the moral difference between them, if one has
already decided that all letting die is passive euthanasia. Ab-
sent that idea, then the AMA’s position is simply that eu-
thanasia is ruled out, and allowing to die is not. If we look
at the latest iteration of the AMA’s policy, this is clearer:
Opinion 5.8 sets out its opposition to the permissibility of
euthanasia, which it defines as “the administration of a le-
thal agent by another person to a patient for the purpose of
relieving the patient’s intolerable and incurable suffering”.
There is no mention of withdrawal or withholding treat-
ment. Where withholding and withdrawal are mentioned,
it is in Opinion 5.3, at which point there is no mention of
passive euthanasia [19]. In other words, the AMA appears
to lean away from Definition 3*. That said, Rachels does
complain about the second paragraph of the AMA’s state-
ment, “for what is the cessation of treatment [ … ] if it is
not ‘the intentional termination of the life of one human
being by another’?” [3] – but, given his appeal to the AMA’s
authority to get his argument going in the first place, this is
a touch ironic. (I shall have more to say about whether one
could cease life-sustaining treatment without intending
death in a little while.)
Be that as it may: it is plausible to hold that Rachels’s
paper, which perhaps owes its influence to having ap-
peared first in the New England Journal of Medicine, has
played a crucially important role in the widespread ac-
ceptance of Definition 3*.9 What remains to be seen is
whether Rachels (or the position with which he has be-
come associated) is correct. If he is not, Definition 3* –
and the legal opinion that relies on it – is in trouble.
And there are compelling reasons to think that he is not.
Rachels on killing and letting die
Much of the donkey-work in Rachels’s argument is done
by a thought-experiment concerning Smith and Jones. In
91975 also saw the publication of a paper called “Should the Patient be
Allowed to Die?” by Richard Nicholson [20], on page 6 of which
passive euthanasia is defined as “a failure to use therapies that would
prolong life in a patient with a terminal illness”; but it is fair to say
that this paper has been much less influential.
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a nutshell, Smith drowns his young cousin in order to
secure an inheritance; Jones notices his young cousin
drowning, and, mindful of the inheritance, is delighted
and attempts no rescue [3, 4]. Rachels’s argument is that
(1) Smith killed and Jones let die;
(2) It is hard to see how there is a moral difference
between Smith’s and Jones’s cases;
(3) Therefore it is hard to see how there is a moral
difference between killing and letting die.
(4) Active euthanasia is killing; passive euthanasia is
letting die.
(5) Therefore there it is hard to see how there is a
moral difference between active and passive euthanasia.
If this is an accurate reconstruction, it should be clear that
Rachels commits an important mistake in the move from
(2) to (3), because he assumes that the reason for the moral
similarity between Smith’s and Jones’s case will apply to all
instances of killing and letting die; and this he does not
argue. I shall have something more to say about that in a
moment. But a further fallacy creeps in at (4), where passive
euthanasia is taken to be not just a kind of letting die, but
identical with it. To show that there is a fallacy, it would be
useful to consider an example of an instance of letting die
that we would not want to call passive euthanasia.
Let us, then, extend the thought experiment. Brown
sees the drowning child, and, believing that she is suffer-
ing so severely that death would be better for her and
that there is no more gentle way to bring it about, holds
her under the water. Robinson sees the drowning child,
and, believing that she is suffering so severely that death
would be better for her and that there is no more gentle
way to bring it about, does nothing to pull her out of the
water. García sees the drowning child, and, believing
simply that it would be impossible to get the child out of
danger of lasting harm, does not intervene.10 In one
sense, Brown is like Smith, since both kill intentionally,
and Robinson and García are like Jones, since all let die.
However, there are also important differences between
these new cases and Smith and Jones’s. For sure, Brown
and Robinson’s intents – that the child’s life should end
– are similar to Smith and Jones’s; but García has a dif-
ferent intent from any. Further, our three new protago-
nists all have a different motivation from Smith and
Jones, since there is no benefit from any will to be had.
Yet if there are differences between Jones’s motivation
and Robinson and García’s, and differences between
García’s intent and all the others’, it would seem that
not all instances of letting die are quite alike in anything
but the most superficial sense; and if not all instances of
letting die are alike, the way is open to asking whether one
of them is better described as passive euthanasia than the
others; and if one is better described as passive euthanasia
than the others, then it cannot be true that having estab-
lished that someone let someone else die will be sufficient
to establish that they performed passive euthanasia.
It would be misplaced to consider Smith’s or Jones’ ac-
tions as instances of euthanasia – active or passive – since
the child’s interests are plainly not served: the intention that
the child’s life should end was not accompanied by the right
sort of motivation. Neither satisfies Definition 1. Provided
that there was no gentler way available of ending the child’s
life, Brown committed active euthanasia, and Robinson pas-
sive: both were motivated by a belief about best interests,
and both intended that the child’s life should end. What
about García? Under Definition 3*, he also committed pas-
sive euthanasia. But, the intent being different, there is a
certain gravity to the idea that his (in)action is qualitatively
different from Robinson’s: García does not withhold inter-
vention so that the child will die. As such, one might easily
be drawn to say that applying the term “passive euthanasia”
to what both Robinson and García do obscures an import-
ant distinction between letting die with the intention of
ending life, and letting die generally. The moral importance
of this distinction – which speaks to the move from (2) to
(3) in the reconstructed argument above – can be acknowl-
edged by anyone but the most implausibly naïve conse-
quentialist. (Note, of course, that drawing a distinction
between Robinson and García’s actions and insisting that it
is morally salient does not have any implications about the
permissibility of either, unless we think that unlike actions
cannot be equally permissible.)
One possible response to this would be to split Defin-
ition 3* into two further subcategories: passive euthan-
asia in which death is the intended outcome, and passive
euthanasia in which it isn’t. But those subcategories
would match Definition 3’s differentiation between pas-
sive euthanasia and other instances of letting die. In
other words, Definition 3* would turn out to be a ver-
sion of Definition 3, but with added scope for confusion.
It would be better to go directly to Definition 3.
This serves to rebut a possible argument along the lines
that preferring Definition 3 to Definition 3* is simply
stipulating that passive euthanasia is one thing rather than
another, and thereby doing little more than gainsaying de-
fenders of Definition 3*. Definition 3 is to be preferred to
Definition 3* because, if we think that there is some kind
of differentiation to be had between Robinson and García,
Definition 3 promises a more precise and more efficient
way of explaining it. This is why, incidentally, it will not
do to defend Definition 3* on the grounds that meaning is
use, that “withholding treatment” is what the term “pas-
sive euthanasia” has grown to mean in at least some con-
texts, and that that is that. Even if the term has shifted
10It seems to me that there is not a straightforward parallel with
García in Rachels’s original scenario.
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from Definition 3 to Definition 3*, we do not have to be
indifferent about it if the shift makes the language that in-
forms ethical and legal decisionmaking less precise. We
can still argue in favour of precision.
This principle applies in clinical contexts. Imagine a vari-
ation on the Brown, Robinson, and García cases above.
McDonald is a medical professional who, believing that his
patient is suffering so severely that death would be better
for her and that there is no more gentle way to bring it
about, administers a fatal overdose in order to precipitate
her death. Campbell is a medical professional who, believ-
ing that his patient is suffering so severely that death would
be better for her and that there is no more gentle way to
bring it about, withholds life-sustaining treatment in order
to precipitate her death. Finally, Mukherjee is a medical
professional who, believing that her patient will not benefit
from it, withholds life-sustaining treatment. According to
Definition 3*, all three would have committed a form of eu-
thanasia, and Campbell and Mukherjee would have com-
mitted passive euthanasia. But it seems plain that
Campbell’s action is intended to cause death; Mukherjee’s
is simply one in which death is a side-effect. For sure,
Mukherjee’s (or García’s) belief may be false, and her in-
action may be blameable. But even if both Mukherjee and
Campbell are blameable, and attract precisely the same
amount of blame, that won’t show that they should both be
described as having performed the same kind of action – of
having performed passive euthanasia. It is preferable to
treat Campbell’s action as passive euthanasia, and Mukher-
jee’s as simple withholding short of passive euthanasia.
The importance of intent
Before pressing the case further, it is worth taking a mo-
ment to consider a possible line of objection that builds
upon the idea that Rachels’ position is not being pre-
sented in the best possible light.
To recap: In the Smith and Jones case, the “no differ-
ence” principle rests on the idea that Smith and Jones
both behave abominably, and that it does not matter in
making that assessment that one acted to kill and the
other let die. This Rachels takes to be evidence that
there is not a moral difference between killing and let-
ting die. If and when killing is wrong, then so is letting
die; likewise, if and when it is not wrong, then neither is
letting die. In the context of euthanasia, this line of
thought is taken to serve as evidence that there is no
moral difference between active and passive euthanasia:
if one is permissible or wrong, then so is the other. As
far as it goes, this argument seems fairly plausible: if our
aim is that someone be dead, then the manner in which
that aim is realised probably does not matter. Yet it may
not go all that far; and this is because – per the argu-
ment in the last section – it blurs a distinction that we
may want to draw between “kinds” of letting die: to wit,
letting die when death is intended, and letting die when
it is not. This is precisely the distinction upon which
Definition 3 rides.
But Rachels thinks that the distinction between a death
that one intends and a death that one does not intend is il-
lusory. Though the Smith and Jones example may not
show it all that clearly, the less widely-cited examples of
Jack and Jill, and of Drs White and Black, which he intro-
duces in his “More Impertinent Distinctions” essay [21],
may help provide a better view of his position. If these ex-
amples provide us with a compelling reason to think that
intent is irrelevant to how we should think about killing
and letting die, the putative distinction between Definition
3 and Definition 3* will have to be abandoned – and, with
it, any distinction between Robinson and García, or be-
tween Campbell and Mukherjee.
In the first example, Rachels introduces us to Jack and Jill.
Each visits their grandmother in order to cheer her up; each
expects that their visits will mean that their grandmother
will become fonder of them, and bequeath them more in
her will. The ostensible difference is that Jack predicts that
a difference will be made to the bequest, but does not in-
tend it; Jill visits so that a difference is made to the bequest.
Yet, says Rachels, though we may think that Jack and Jill’s
characters differ in morally important ways, we cannot deny
that what they actually do – the physical business of turning
up for a chat over tea and cake – is the same, and so must
attract the same evaluation. The rightness, permissibility, or
wrongness of a particular action does not depend on the
intention behind it. And if that is so – if intention is unim-
portant and there is no distinction to be drawn between
doing something so that something will come about, and
doing it even though it will – it would seem to follow that
there is no distinction between letting die and passive eu-
thanasia. Definition 3* ought to be embraced.
Similarly, in the second example, White and Black are
both confronted with the case of a severely ill infant
whom it is impossible to save, and whose suffering may
be increased by further treatment. White decides to
withhold treatment, notwithstanding that death will be
quicker than it could be; Black decides to withhold fur-
ther treatment so that death will be quicker than it could
be. Again, says Rachels, their (in)action is the same;
again, there is no distinction to be drawn between killing
and letting die. And this example is particularly pertin-
ent to the question of passive euthanasia: we may think
that either acted rightly, permissibly, or wrongly; but be-
cause they both did the same thing, what we say about
one we have to say about the other. Again, there is no
line between letting die and passive euthanasia. Again, if
that is right, a proponent of Definition 3 would seem to
be forcing a distinction where there is none.
How convincing is Rachels, and anyone who follows a
similar argumentative strategy, here?
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The answer to this question must be “Not very”.
Through the White and Black example, Rachels certainly
succeeds in showing that what Definition 3 would have us
call letting die and passive euthanasia are equally permis-
sible in some cases; and it might even be that they are
equally permissible in all cases. From this, we can accept
that he is right to say that what he calls the “traditional”
position, that letting die is somehow less bad than killing,
is mistaken. However, it does not follow from that that
“passive euthanasia” is simply letting die, because while it
would be true that α and β are equally permissible when
all αs are βs, that does not entitle us to say that all αs are
βs when they are equally permissible. Rachels’s argument,
therefore, missteps here. More, my claim in this paper is
precisely that, whatever the permissibility of passive eu-
thanasia and letting die, they are different things; therefore
we cannot reach any conclusions about the permissibility
(and legality) of passive euthanasia simply by pointing out
that letting die is or can be permissible (or legal).
So what are the flaws in Rachels’s position? Two stand
out. The first is that his account of what Jack and Jill, and
White and Black, do is somewhat threadbare. It is hard to
make sense of an action, morally or metaphysically, without
some account of intention. To stipulate that the physical
movements of Jack, Jill, White and Black are the whole
story in understanding what they did is to take a strange
view of what an action is – it is something like insisting that
there is nothing to a symphony except pressure waves in
air. In one sense, this is true, of course; but if someone said
that he would be out tonight because he was going to wit-
ness the Hallé Orchestra making pressure waves in air, we
would wonder what, precisely, he had paid for. Music is not
reducible to its bare physical characteristics; and neither is
any other human endeavour. The movements that consti-
tute actions are contextualised by projects, and understood
by the part they are intended to play in those projects. By
parity of reasoning, it seems that if someone tries to insist
that killing and letting die are the same things in all respects
just because the physical movements are the same, they
have missed something important about the project upon
with the person doing the movement has embarked.
The other flaw is that Rachels’s account seems not to
be able to make sense of the distinction between success
and failure. Imagine that Jill’s grandmother had sussed
out exactly what was going on, and was therefore at the
very best no better-disposed towards Jill than she had
been before Jill visited. On Rachels’s account, there is no
distinction to be had between what Jack and Jill did. But
insofar as that Jack would have succeeded in his project
while Jill would have failed in hers, this would seem to
force us to say that neither is there any meaningful dis-
tinction between an action’s success and failure. Yet that
looks absurd; we cannot claim to have understood an ac-
tion if, as a matter of principle, we cannot say whether it
did what it was supposed to do. Seen from the other
side, it would become quite mysterious how it could be
that Jack had succeeded in his project and Jill failed in
hers, granted that they are supposed to have done the
same thing. And so we turn out to have a reason to re-
sist the idea that they had done exactly the same thing
after all. The simplest way to make that distinction is to
appeal to Jack and Jill’s intention. Or, to put it another
way, intention has earned its place in understanding –
and determining – what an action is.
To iterate: Rachels’s argument, we can allow, is per-
fectly sound when it comes to showing that different ac-
tions, or even different kinds of action, may be of exactly
the same moral worth, and for corresponding reasons.
White and Black both want the best for the child in their
care, and this will be of central importance when decid-
ing permissibility. But establishing moral congruence
will not establish that we are talking about the same ac-
tion, or the same kind of action, in each case. As such,
there is a role for intention after all; and this means that
Definition 3 is likely to be a better definition of passive
euthanasia than Definition 3* even when the strengths of
Rachels’s argument are taken into account, simply be-
cause of the role that intention plays.
Foresight and intent
The argument so far rests on the supposition that
Mukherjee does not intend the patient’s death, and that it
is on this basis that she did not commit euthanasia. But,
on the assumption that she is a tolerably competent
medic, she must have foreseen that death as the likely out-
come of withholding life-sustaining treatment; and that
withholding was itself intentional. We might be tempted
to think that we cannot really divorce the death from the
intent, and that the death was therefore intentional after
all. (As we have seen, this is a position that Rachels seems
to endorse.) This might mean that any non-negligent in-
stance of letting die really is passive euthanasia.
Yet this objection rests on an unwarranted conflation
of the foreseen outcome of an intentional action, and its
intended outcome. That the two are not the same can
be easily demonstrated. Suppose I am considering
whether or not to have another glass of wine. I have a
reason not to: as a martyr to hangovers, I think I will be
fine in the morning if I abstain, but that a further drink
will make me feel dreadful. On the other hand, the wine
is good, I am enjoying the conversation that accompan-
ies it, and so on. All things considered, I decide to help
myself to another glass. Now, it is certainly true that the
ensuing headache would be a foreseen consequence of
an intentional action, and I could only really say that it
was my own fault. But it would be quite a stretch to say
on the basis of that that I intended to have a hangover.
As I sip my wine, I hope that this will be the exception
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to the norm, and that I will, for a change, escape any
particularly deleterious consequences. This is sufficient
to show the difference between foresight and intent: it
would be very strange to say that I might intend some-
thing the non-appearance of which would be a relief.11
Yet if I can intentionally drink another glass of wine
without intending to get the hangover that nevertheless I
expect, much the same would appear to be the case for
Mukherjee. There is no reason at all to suppose that in
intentionally withholding of life-sustaining treatment she
intends that the patient should die. Mukherjee could even
acknowledge that that would be the overwhelmingly likely
outcome; it would still be coherent for her to hope for the
patient’s unexpected survival, just as I could hope to avoid
a hangover that I think more or less certain. This would
not be the case for McDonald or Campbell. This is a point
that was articulated well by Garrard and Wilkinson in
their 2005 paper. Their understanding of passive euthan-
asia requires, in accordance with Definition 3, that “the
main purpose (or one of the main purposes) of withdraw-
ing or withholding is to bring about (or hasten) the pa-
tient’s death” [2; slightly altered]. And, they argue,
whether the healthcare professional’s intention is to
bring about death can be established by using the
following counterfactual test: if the patient does not
die, has the health carer succeeded in his or her
aim? In the case of passive euthanasia, the answer
will be ‘no’ because the health carer was aiming at
the patient’s death. But in the case of withdrawing
or withholding treatment because it would be
burdensome or harmful, then the health carer can
have succeeded in this aim – to protect the patient
from a particular burden or harm – even if the
patient pulls through without treatment [2].
That the patient’s survival would have thwarted Camp-
bell’s project and not Mukherjee’s is vitally important,
and shows that there is a significant difference between
the moral natures of their respective projects. That there
is this difference in their moral natures will tell us noth-
ing very much about whether either is permissible –
maybe Campbell should be praised, or maybe Mukherjee
was negligent; but it provides us with much firmer
ground on which to base any subsequent normative
claim or evaluation. What matters is that the reasons be-
hind the assessment cannot be facsimiles of each other.
Acts of omission
If the above is correct, it shows that there is a thorough-
going distinction to be drawn between Definition 3 and
Definition 3* of passive euthanasia, and that Definition 3
is preferable. This is for three reasons. First, it tracks the
important distinction between withholding treatment so
that the patient dies, and withholding treatment even
though the patient dies. Second, it makes discussion of
passive euthanasia clearer, since it relieves us of the bur-
den of having to come up with a further way to talk of the
so-that/even-though distinction. Third, the relationship of
Definition 3 to Definition 1 mirrors neatly the relationship
of Definition 2 to Definition 1. The difference between
Definition 2 and Definition 3 is simply one of whether
positive action is present or absent; intention is conserved.
As noted above, Definitions 2 and 3 each therefore narrow
the scope of Definition 1. Definition 3*, by contrast, is
somewhat more complicated, inasmuch as that it narrows
the scope of Definition 1 it in one respect (by stipulating
that it refers only to instances in which treatment is with-
held), but widens it in another (by removing any stipula-
tion about intent). This consideration may not be
definitive; but it is also not unreasonable to think that
clear thinking about passive euthanasia is easier when the
relationships between definitions are as simple as possible.
But the presence or absence of positive action invites a
further take on the question of the nature of passive
euthanasia.
Consider this passage from Rachels’s “Active and Pas-
sive Euthanasia”:
It is not exactly correct to say that in passive
euthanasia the doctor does nothing, for he does do
one thing that is very important: he lets the patient
die. “Letting someone die” is certainly different, in
some respects, from other types of action – mainly
in that it is a kind of action that one may perform
by way of not performing certain other actions [3].
Consider also this, from his essay “Killing and Letting
Die”, originally in the Encyclopedia of Ethics:
So what is the difference between causing and
allowing? What real difference is marked by those
words? The most obvious ways of attempting to
draw the distinction won’t work. For example,
suppose we say it is the difference between action
and inaction – when we cause an outcome, we do
something, but when we merely allow it to happen,
we passively stand by and do nothing. This won’t
work because, when we allow something to happen,
we do perform at least one act: the act of allowing it
to happen. The problem is that the distinction
between doing something and not doing something
is relative to the specification of what is or is not
done – if I allow someone to die, I do not save him,
but I do let him die [22].
11The arguments here would obviously apply to debates about the
doctrine of double effect, too.
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Rachels’s position here must be that allowing a death is
a kind of action. But, that being the case, we might won-
der what exactly is passive about it. It looks rather as
though Rachels is hinting that there might be no such
thing as passive euthanasia, and that putatively passive
euthanasia is active in at least some sense after all, be-
cause even an omission is a kind of action.
On this theme, it is worth noting that, in an article
about the Shanbaug case, Rohini Shukla has suggested
that withholding treatment is one thing, and withdrawing
it quite another, such that only the former would count as
passive euthanasia proper [23] – again, the thought here is
that to withdraw treatment is a kind of action, and that
withdrawal is therefore a kind of active euthanasia. But
even when talking about withholding, her claim makes
use of one of the ways that some people have tried to
make sense of passive euthanasia, which is to advert to the
phrase “act of omission”. Thus
[w]ithholding life support implies that crucial
medical intervention is restrained, for example, not
performing a kidney transplant when it is necessary
for the patient’s survival. This would involve acts of
omission on the part of the doctor [23].
Shortly after this, she claims that “in passive euthanasia
the doctor only passively commits acts of omission” [23].
It is hard to say what “passively committing” an act is;
but what matters is the deployment of the idea of an
“act of omission”. It would seem to be very like what
Rachels was talking about in his insistence that not to
treat is a kind of action in its own right.
Shukla is not the only one to use the phrase. For ex-
ample, Sawyer et al write that
[a]ctive euthanasia is a positive act of commission,
such as a lethal injection; passive euthanasia implies
an act of omission, such as the withholding or
withdrawal of treatment [24].
This is echoed by DiBaise, whose formulation of passive
euthanasia is similar:
Euthanasia can be active, as when someone
intentionally chooses to kill a person by an act of
commission, or it can be passive, as when someone
brings about the death of a person by an act of
omission [25].
But what are we to make of the phrase “act of omission”,
or the thought that withholding treatment is, despite ap-
pearances, a kind of action?
A moment’s thought shows that we should probably
be nonplussed. Rachels’s position, on examination,
seems tautologous at best, “letting” and “allowing” be-
ing much the same in standard English. Talking about
“acts of omission” might break the tautology, but both
its meaning and the motivation for appealing to it are
obscure. It is possible that the phrase reflects a belief
that only actions can stand moral scrutiny, and that
we must treat everything as an action if we are to say
anything morally interesting about it. But that would
fly in the face of any insistence that there is no moral
distinction between active and passive euthanasia qua
killing and letting die, and there is no reason at all to
suppose that all things that we would want to praise
or blame must be actions anyway. Negligence can be
established in ethics simply by showing that an agent
did not do what she ought to have done; we don’t
have to show that something was done as a part of
that.
The metaphysical legitimacy of the idea of an “act of
omission” would seem to rest on a number of tacit, but
ultimately unconvincing, assumptions. One of these we
might call hyperpositivism. Hyperpositivism is charac-
terised by the insistence that every decision is a (posi-
tive) decision to φ, rather than a (negative) decision not
to ψ. Thus, a negative decision to withhold treatment is
actually a disguised positive decision – either to not-
treat (as though that is a verb in its own right), or to do
something else. Yet it should be clear that hyperpositi-
vism is fallacious. In the first place, it seems demanding:
having decided that a decision is a decision to φ, rather
than not to ψ, we must scrabble around to find some-
thing for φ to be. It is more parsimonious not to give
ourselves this job. More fundamentally, it is simply false
that a decision not to ψ is actually a decision to φ. For
example: suppose I had planned to go to the cinema this
evening, but that my mood changed, and I find myself
no longer so inclined. Although we might say that I had
decided to stay at home instead, this is a figure of
speech: we should not conclude that staying at home
was a positive decision. Rather, staying at home is the
default. It’s what one does if one doesn’t go out. One
doesn’t have to choose to do it, because it’s not really
doing anything at all. It’s what one “does” – and the
word “does” should perhaps be used only with some
hesitation – if one is suddenly overtaken by a wave of in-
difference to everything; and inertia is neither an action
nor conducive thereto. If it were, it wouldn’t be inertia.
Equally, we would not want to say that φ represents the
action of not-going-to-the-cinema, which I had chosen
over going to the cinema, because not-going-to-the-cin-
ema is not an action. It is an omission pure and simple,
and there is no need to try to force it to be anything
else.
Another tacit assumption, which is a sequela to hyper-
positivism, is that there is always a clear thing for φ to
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be. This, too, is a little hard to swallow, for there is an
indefinitely long list of things that φ could be, and it
might well be that we can only identify which is the cor-
rect candidate retrospectively. This leaves us wide open
to accusations of having fallen victim to the post hoc ergo
propter hoc fallacy. Suppose that, having decided against
going to the cinema, I watch A Space Odyssey on DVD
for the two-thousand-and-first time, or bake, or draft a
rather pedantic essay for an academic journal. Conceiv-
ably, someone might say, “Ah-ha! Brasso chose to draft
an essay instead of going out!” as though this is a discov-
ery about my state of mind when I chose not to go to
the cinema. But putting to one side the possibility that I
simply sit and stare blankly into the middle distance
until overcome by sleep, I have to do something to fill
the gap between now and bedtime: I have time free,
which I subsequently fill. But finding oneself φ-ing is not
the same as choosing to φ, and choosing to φ to fill the
gap left by not ψ-ing is not the same as choosing φ over
ψ. (I take it as a given that we would want to resist any
line of argument that would force us to assert that I
might have chosen to stare blankly into the middle dis-
tance simply for want of anything better to assert.)
Working the other way, it might well be the case that
someone did not ψ because she was too busy φ-ing; but
in cases like this, it is the omission of ψ that bothers us,
not the commission of φ, and we can make sense of
claims about the former – claims about whether it was
negligent, for example – without having to impute
claims about the latter.
Now, a fairly obvious response to all this is that it mis-
ses the point that there is an important distinction to be
made between withholding treatment based on a belief
about a shorter life being better for the patient than a
longer one, and simply not providing it because, say, one
forgot, or was otherwise engaged. “Euthanasia” could
only ever be used in situations in which an agent decides
to withhold treatment; and inasmuch as that a positive
choice is required, this is where the act in an act of
omission is to be found. Hence the phrase “act of omis-
sion” should not be all that perplexing after all. And, as
far as it goes, this line of thought is fair enough; but it
leaves untouched two important points. The first is that
it does not address the distinction between deliberately
withdrawing treatment so that life will be ended, and de-
liberately withdrawing treatment even though life will be
ended – that is, the distinction between Definitions 3
and 3*. The second is that it also blurs the distinction
between Definition 2 and Definition 3, since the agent
would be positively “doing” something in all circum-
stances. For sure, some people might think that this is
all to the good – that the distinction between active and
passive euthanasia is a distinction without a difference
anyway. Such a position is tenable. But in that case, we
would be justified in saying that one should not talk
about passive euthanasia at all, since there turns out to
be no such thing (and arguments about the difference
between Definition 3 and Definition 3* would be re-
vealed to be barely even scholastic). Yet inasmuch as
that people do talk about passive euthanasia, and talk
about it in certain ways, the position outlined here
stands. Whether or not they should is a question for an-
other paper.
If this is correct, it suggests that we can talk about
omissions perfectly straightforwardly without having to
think that all omissions are kinds of action. We don’t
have to talk about what Campbell or Mukherjee did to
make moral sense of events; it’s enough to say that they
did not treat, and then to concern ourselves with the
presence or absence of an intention to end a life. We
might want to talk about what they did instead; but we
do not have to. Talk about “acts of omission” simply
adds layers of nouns for the sake of propping up a
dogma about agency that we have no obvious reason to
maintain to begin with. It is for the best if we steer clear
of the whole wobbly edifice. Acts are acts; omissions are
omissions; and there is no particular reason to suppose
that a medical decision to withhold treatment, qua omis-
sion, has to be an “act of omission”. Since parsimony is a
virtue, we shouldn’t.
The importance of clear definitions
Rachels’s paper (and the position that it reflects) is cor-
rect insofar as that it claims that, when ending some-
one’s life is wrong, it does not matter whether it is by
killing or letting die. And because there need be no nor-
mative distinction to be drawn between killing and let-
ting die per se, neither need there be one to be drawn
between active and passive euthanasia, since they are
species of killing and letting die. However, by giving in-
sufficient attention to motive and intent, Rachels ob-
scured the important differences that do obtain between
some instances of letting die, and, on that basis, that can
be discerned between passive euthanasia and other kinds
of letting die. This obscurity has persisted throughout a
great deal of work, both within and without the
academy.
Why does any of this matter? Why is this not simply a
pettifogging paper about the use of a small phrase?
There is a handful of reasons.
In the first place, even in the absence of any normative
claims about how we should evaluate killing and letting
die, what should be clear is that one cannot skip straight
from a claim about the permissibility of one to the per-
missibility of the other. It might be that killing a patient
by withholding treatment is permissible in at least some
cases, and maybe in many; but this cannot be just be-
cause letting die often is. Passive euthanasia is a kind of
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letting die, but it is not reducible to letting die. This
matters because it provides us with a lens through which
we can examine statutes and judicial opinions and the
way they are interpreted, and the dicta of judges in dif-
ferent regimes. The bare fact that a phrase like “passive
euthanasia” may get used differently in different times
and places is not of all that much importance in itself;
but how legal systems or commentators understand the
term, and the plausibility of each understanding, is. If
there is ambiguity about something like the meaning of
“passive euthanasia” as it is used within a legal regime,
we may expect that the quality of legal decisionmaking,
or policymaking, would suffer; as Chan and Tse note
when considering passive euthanasia in a Hong Kong
context,
it would not help public discussion if the term
‘passive euthanasia’ is used indiscriminately without
a clear definition, especially when non-controversial
cases of forgoing [life-sustaining treatment] are
referred to as ‘euthanasia.’ [26]
Indeed, if ambiguity leads to confusion about the le-
gality of passive euthanasia, it may leave medical staff
and those in associated roles in danger of violating
the law unwittingly. For example, if they are told that
passive euthanasia is legal, and interpret this to mean
that they may intentionally end someone’s life, when
the authority that assured them of its legality meant
simply that it was legal only to withhold unhelpful
treatment, they may commit a serious, life-ending,
blunder. (Relevant here is the claim by Cipriani and
Fiorino that English law allows for passive euthanasia
based on the assumption that passive euthanasia is
nothing but the withdrawal of treatment [27]. That,
and how, a medical professional who takes such a
statement at face value may end up in serious trouble
hardly needs spelling out.) Seen from a certain per-
spective, things might be almost as bad for the pa-
tient in a regime where euthanasia is illegal, and who
is kept alive by means of burdensome medical treat-
ment administered by medical staff labouring under
the impression that withdrawing treatment is euthan-
asia and therefore forbidden.
A remedy to problems like this might well depend on
settling on a secure and compelling definition. So which
definition should we choose?
I have argued in this paper that there is a significant
difference between what I called Definition 3 and Defin-
ition 3*, and that there are good reasons to prefer the
former. Further, it is reasonable to think that this should
be reflected in law; for even if law built on shaky defin-
itional foundations is law for all that, it is nevertheless
reasonable to prefer that the law at least aspire to
stability. A law that is blind to a distinction between φ
and ψ for any given φ and ψ is a less acute law than it
might be, and potentially a flawed law.
Conclusion
The core claim of this essay is that there are two
possible and incompatible ways to understand the
term “passive euthanasia”. On one understanding, pre-
sented here as Definition 3, an intent to end life is
required; on the other, presented as Definition 3*, the
action that ends life may be intended, but the end of
life itself need not be. Despite the prevalence of Def-
inition 3*, the argument has sought to defend the
position that Definition 3 should be preferred. With-
drawing life-sustaining treatment when death is not
the intended outcome – and it may not be12 – is not
euthanasia at all, passive or otherwise. A sub-theme
of the argument has been that the prominence – even
if not necessarily the provenance – of Definition 3*
can be traced to James Rachels’s work, and to its re-
ception in the literature since; idea here has been that
if Rachels’s argument is mistaken, then claims that
rely on it or that have the same structure must also
be rejected. In this light, it is important to note that
even if Rachels himself would have fought shy of the
claim that all instances of withholding treatment are
instances of passive euthanasia, there is enough in the
work that he produced to sustain Definition 3*; and
even the most charitable reading of Rachels would
still force us to admit that his understanding of the
term “passive euthanasia” is unclear and his use of it
is confusing.
It would be false to claim to be the first to take on the
task of clarifying the meaning of “passive euthanasia”.
The position outlined here is very much in line with that
adopted by Garrard and Wilkinson in 2005 [2]. Indeed,
as long ago as 1979, Bonnie Steinbock was arguing
against Rachels’s claims about the AMA [29]. And yet,
as we have seen, versions of Definition 3* recur and hold
sway in the academic literature and beyond. For this rea-
son, it is worth making the argument again, if only for
the sake of fortifying the trenches in which the wider
normative battle is fought. Passive euthanasia should not
be identified with withholding of life-sustaining treat-
ment. Only some instances of non-treatment, instances
in which the intention is to end life, are instances of pas-
sive euthanasia.
12cf. the similar point made by Joel Gamble et al: “Causing death could
be in patients’ and physicians’ intentional landscapes in [withdrawal of
care], but it need not be.” [28]
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